The statutory inquiries after homicides by The statutory inquiries after homicides by people with mental illness have been repeople with mental illness have been replaced by a system of mandatory reporting placed by a system of mandatory reporting to the newly established National Patient to the newly established National Patient Safety Agency (Department of Health, Safety Agency (Department of Health, 2001 2001a ). This reflects a radical change : p. 24). This reflects a radical change in the way that adverse events or 'near in the way that adverse events or 'near misses' in medicine are to be investigated. misses' in medicine are to be investigated. Drawing on lessons from engineering on Drawing on lessons from engineering on improving safety in aviation and the improving safety in aviation and the nuclear power industry, the Department nuclear power industry, the Department of Health has moved from an individual of Health has moved from an individual to a system-centred approach. Whereas to a system-centred approach. Whereas the traditional investigation generally the traditional investigation generally stopped when human error was identified, stopped when human error was identified, the systems approach takes error as a the systems approach takes error as a symptom, not a cause, and asks why it symptom, not a cause, and asks why it happened, and what were the factors happened, and what were the factors operating on the individual that contribuoperating on the individual that contributed to the negative outcome (Department ted to the negative outcome (Department of Health, 2000) . This approach to investiof Health, 2000) . This approach to investigations could potentially lead to far more gations could potentially lead to far more constructive solutions than those offered constructive solutions than those offered by the current system of inquiries after by the current system of inquiries after homicides. homicides.
LIMITATIONS OF THE LIMITATIONS OF THE TRADITIONAL APPROACH TR ADITIONAL APPROACH
Traditional accident investigations tend to Traditional accident investigations tend to look first for any technical fault that exlook first for any technical fault that explains why things went wrong; failing that, plains why things went wrong; failing that, they go on to consider whether human they go on to consider whether human actions or omissions led to the disaster. If actions or omissions led to the disaster. If human error is identified, this is usually human error is identified, this is usually accepted as a satisfactory explanation and accepted as a satisfactory explanation and the questioning ends. Investigations in a the questioning ends. Investigations in a wide range of settings -aviation, anaesthewide range of settings -aviation, anaesthesia, nuclear power plants -have concluded sia, nuclear power plants -have concluded by blaming human error in 60-80% of by blaming human error in 60-80% of cases. If accidents are due to human incomcases. If accidents are due to human incompetence, then the solution lies in increasing petence, then the solution lies in increasing control: control:
'To cope with this perceived unreliability of peo-'To cope with this perceived unreliability of people, the implication is that one should reduce or ple, the implication is that one should reduce or regiment the human role in managing the potenregiment the human role in managing the potentially hazardous system. In general, this is attially hazardous system. In general, this is attempted by enforcing standard practices and tempted by enforcing standard practices and work rules, by exiling culprits, by policing of work rules, by exiling culprits, by policing of practitioners, and by using automation to shift practitioners, and by using automation to shift activityaway frompeople' (Woods activityaway frompeople' (Woods et al et al,1994, p. 2) . ,1994, p. 2).
Some mental health inquiries have been Some mental health inquiries have been into organisations rather than individual into organisations rather than individual cases, and have taken a more systemic cases, and have taken a more systemic approach, as in the Ashworth Special Hosapproach, as in the Ashworth Special Hospital investigation (Fallon pital investigation (Fallon et al et al, 1999) . , 1999). Inquiries into homicides, however, have Inquiries into homicides, however, have typically been of the traditional type. typically been of the traditional type. One study found that human error in relaOne study found that human error in relation to clinical or risk assessment was tion to clinical or risk assessment was identified in 65% of homicide inquiries identified in 65% of homicide inquiries . The solutions . The solutions have also followed the traditional model: have also followed the traditional model: individuals are named and shamed, more individuals are named and shamed, more procedures are introduced to reduce the procedures are introduced to reduce the scope for fallible individual judgement, scope for fallible individual judgement, and tighter managerial control is encourand tighter managerial control is encouraged; yet there is little evidence that the aged; yet there is little evidence that the inquiries are producing an accumulating inquiries are producing an accumulating body of knowledge that is improving body of knowledge that is improving practice (Eastman, 1996: p. 170) . practice (Eastman, 1996: p. 170 ).
THE SYSTEMIC APPROACH THE SYSTEMIC APPROACH
The new approach differs in seeking to unThe new approach differs in seeking to understand more deeply the reasons people derstand more deeply the reasons people acted in the way they did. Front-line workacted in the way they did. Front-line workers are not seen as autonomous decisioners are not seen as autonomous decisionmakers culpably responsible for their makers culpably responsible for their choices; it is assumed that their choice of choices; it is assumed that their choice of action is influenced by the system in which action is influenced by the system in which they are operating. A distinction is made they are operating. A distinction is made between latent and active errors (Reason, between latent and active errors . Active errors are the mistakes made 1990). Active errors are the mistakes made by front-line practitioners, such as failing to by front-line practitioners, such as failing to record information or to pass it on to a record information or to pass it on to a colleague. Latent error conditions are colleague. Latent error conditions are embedded in the system -for example, in embedded in the system -for example, in management policy, resource allocations management policy, resource allocations or procedural instructions. These, when or procedural instructions. These, when combined with local factors and individual combined with local factors and individual errors, feed into a causal sequence that errors, feed into a causal sequence that leads to an adverse outcome. leads to an adverse outcome.
The National Patient Safety Agency reThe National Patient Safety Agency recommends a root cause analysis: 'a struccommends a root cause analysis: 'a structured investigation that aims to identify tured investigation that aims to identify the true cause of a problem, and the actions the true cause of a problem, and the actions necessary to eliminate it' (Department of necessary to eliminate it' (Department of Health, 2001 Health, 2001b . The focus of the ana-: p. 38). The focus of the analysis should be on systems and processes, lysis should be on systems and processes, not people, and investigators are not people, and investigators are encouraged to 'repeatedly ask ''why?'' for encouraged to 'repeatedly ask ''why?'' for each cause to drill down to the root each cause to drill down to the root cause(s)'. The findings should lead to modcause(s)'. The findings should lead to modification of the system, rather than punishification of the system, rather than punishment of individuals. For example, in ment of individuals. For example, in mental health care, staffing levels, bed mental health care, staffing levels, bed availability and the priorities set by manavailability and the priorities set by managers trying to meet government targets agers trying to meet government targets may act upon the professionals so that they may act upon the professionals so that they often fail to make thorough risk assessoften fail to make thorough risk assessments. Many of these incomplete assessments. Many of these incomplete assessments are reasonably accurate and no ments are reasonably accurate and no harm ensues, but occasionally a highly sigharm ensues, but occasionally a highly significant detail may be overlooked that, nificant detail may be overlooked that, had it been known, would have substanhad it been known, would have substantially increased the assessment of risk. If a tially increased the assessment of risk. If a homicide then occurs, with hindsight it will homicide then occurs, with hindsight it will be clear that the failure of a member of staff be clear that the failure of a member of staff to ask relatives about the patient's state of to ask relatives about the patient's state of mind (for example) played a crucial part mind (for example) played a crucial part in the faulty risk assessment. The traditionin the faulty risk assessment. The traditional inquiry would then rebuke the profesal inquiry would then rebuke the professional responsible for the omission and sional responsible for the omission and remind all staff of the importance of speakremind all staff of the importance of speaking to relatives. The new approach, in coning to relatives. The new approach, in contrast, would ask whether incomplete trast, would ask whether incomplete assessments were commonplace and, if so, assessments were commonplace and, if so, why staff were choosing to cut corners. why staff were choosing to cut corners. Woods Woods et al et al (1994: p. 48 This theoretical framework requires a This theoretical framework requires a substantially different way of conducting substantially different way of conducting error investigations, since it includes error investigations, since it includes factors such as organisational culture, factors such as organisational culture, management, cognition and emotions. management, cognition and emotions. ( 2 0 0 4 ) , 1 8 5 , 3^4 ( 2 0 0 4 ) , 1 8 5 , 3^4 Creating such a cultural change is a major Creating such a cultural change is a major task. Individuals, understandably, fear that task. Individuals, understandably, fear that reports of lapses in their work may be used reports of lapses in their work may be used against them. It is a radical move to learn to against them. It is a radical move to learn to celebrate errors as an occasion for learning. celebrate errors as an occasion for learning. The organisation has to devise ways of The organisation has to devise ways of rewarding people for their honesty. rewarding people for their honesty. For the National Health Service, there is For the National Health Service, there is the additional problem that it cannot create the additional problem that it cannot create a completely 'no blame' reporting system. a completely 'no blame' reporting system. Individuals still have legal responsibility Individuals still have legal responsibility for their professional actions and cannot for their professional actions and cannot be given immunity from legal action by serbe given immunity from legal action by service users. Work needs to be done to clarify vice users. Work needs to be done to clarify the criteria for reports that can be guaranthe criteria for reports that can be guaranteed confidentiality. Mental health services teed confidentiality. Mental health services also face the problem of dealing with the inalso face the problem of dealing with the intense public anxiety about violent patients. tense public anxiety about violent patients. The mandatory inquiries after homicide The mandatory inquiries after homicide were instigated as a response to this preswere instigated as a response to this pressure. The new reporting system will need sure. The new reporting system will need to be explained well to the public if it is to be explained well to the public if it is not to be misinterpreted as a way of letting not to be misinterpreted as a way of letting professionals avoid responsibility for poor professionals avoid responsibility for poor practice. practice.
B R I T I S H J O UR N A L O F P SYC HI AT RY B R I T I S H J O UR N A L O F P S YC H I AT RY
E D I T O R I A L E D I T O R I A L
CAUSES AND SOLUTIONS CAUSES AND SOLUTIONS
In talking of a 'true' cause and identifying In talking of a 'true' cause and identifying it as the focus for change, the National it as the focus for change, the National Patient Safety Agency misrepresents the Patient Safety Agency misrepresents the story. Some causes may be 'deeper' than story. Some causes may be 'deeper' than others in the system -embedded, for inothers in the system -embedded, for instance, in the organisational culture -but stance, in the organisational culture -but they are not 'truer'. The adverse event they are not 'truer'. The adverse event arises from the interaction of numerous arises from the interaction of numerous factors at all levels in the system; changing factors at all levels in the system; changing any one of them may significantly alter the any one of them may significantly alter the causal interaction of the others and so recausal interaction of the others and so reduce or increase the probability of error. duce or increase the probability of error. Devising solutions will not follow automaDevising solutions will not follow automatically from identifying a root cause, but tically from identifying a root cause, but will take intellectual effort and be limited will take intellectual effort and be limited by political and economic factors. by political and economic factors.
Some organisations have been identiSome organisations have been identified as maintaining a high level of safety, fied as maintaining a high level of safety, for example US air traffic control and nufor example US air traffic control and nuclear aircraft carriers. These 'high reliabilclear aircraft carriers. These 'high reliability organisations' have several distinctive ity organisations' have several distinctive features (La . features . They show flexibility and an ability to reThey show flexibility and an ability to respond to unexpected events by moving spond to unexpected events by moving from a hierarchical structure operating from a hierarchical structure operating with standard procedures to an emergency with standard procedures to an emergency mode where rank is less important than exmode where rank is less important than expertise and rules may be broken in the inpertise and rules may be broken in the interests of dealing with the crisis. They terests of dealing with the crisis. They also operate with a degree of redundancy also operate with a degree of redundancy of equipment and staff to enable them to of equipment and staff to enable them to cope with unexpected circumstances. They cope with unexpected circumstances. They expect errors to happen, and train their expect errors to happen, and train their workforce to recognise and recover from workforce to recognise and recover from them. them.
Overall, the new reporting and investiOverall, the new reporting and investigation system holds out considerable progation system holds out considerable promise of improving services. Homicide mise of improving services. Homicide inquiries might have been useful in allaying inquiries might have been useful in allaying public concerns but generated little effecpublic concerns but generated little effective learning. However, the new system tive learning. However, the new system requires substantial work both in developrequires substantial work both in developing skills for investigating systems and in ing skills for investigating systems and in changing organisational culture to encouchanging organisational culture to encourage openness about lapses from estabrage openness about lapses from established protocols and standards. Also, the lished protocols and standards. Also, the National Patient Safety Agency, as a cenNational Patient Safety Agency, as a centralised agency, will face a significant task tralised agency, will face a significant task in disseminating lessons that need to be in disseminating lessons that need to be absorbed into the operating culture of local absorbed into the operating culture of local services. services.
